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## PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA.

WITH an instinct truer than the reasons alleged, Jerome has included in his catalogue of illustrious men and writers of the Christian Church Philo the Jew and Seneca the Stoic. The traditions on which he relies—that Philo met Peter at Rome on his second embassy to Claudius, and described Christian communities in a treatise “On the Life of Contemplation,” and that Seneca corresponded with Paul—are probably the outcome of a natural tendency which seeks to bring into relation the famous figures of a past epoch. Their real justification and Jerome’s lies rather in the indisputable fact of the real and important influence which these disciples of Plato and the Porch exercised upon the teaching of the successors of Paul and Peter. But in Judaism there was no dignity titular or real for Philo. As philosophy, Greek or Roman, became gradually more and more thoroughly enlisted on the side of the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, it would seem that the cry went out, “To your tents, O Israel.” The attempt to justify the Monotheism of the Old Covenant to the great Greek world was gradually abandoned. The propaganda pursued by popular means like the Sibylline Oracles was dropped. The early Greek translation of the Bible was replaced by the versions of Aquila, Symmachus and Theodotion—Jews all, well aware at last of the dangers of loose renderings. Finally the canon of books to which appeal lay was definitely restricted and the authority of “Apocrypha” and “Pseudepigrapha” denied—all the more easily because it had never been formally recognized. Judaism would have none of an Hellenism identified

with Christianity. Greek language and Greek culture became as hateful as when they were forced upon the Jews of Palestine by the ruthless, fruitless efforts of Antiochus Epiphanes.

If this may be regarded as a fair outline of the tendencies of the first few centuries of the Christian era, it is obvious that Judaism had at that time no room for Philo—must indeed of necessity regard him as a deserter by anticipation, a traitor to the Law, who had sold the keys of the stronghold of Monotheism.

For in Philo, as in Seneca, philosophy triumphed over nationality and national religion, and Philo in his exposition of the Law on principles of Platonism and Stoicism—fit fellow thus for Seneca—had offered to the Gentiles the key of knowledge which was the peculiar possession of the Scribes. And so Philo stands alone, a pathetic figure in the history of thought, befriended and adopted only by the foes of that religion which he loved, which he sought to commend to the nations, whose sacred books he accepted with loyal obedience and expounded with tireless devotion. It was not until a much later period that Jews have in part reclaimed Philo as their own.

Whatever the Hebrew Jews, in the first Christian centuries, might think of the wisdom of the Greeks, they could afford to ignore it. But it was far otherwise with the Jews of the Dispersion. They, the Hellenists, for their own sake no less than for the sake of possible converts, made terms with Hellenism. They had the truth in the written revelation of the Law, and if the claim of the Gentiles, that in their wisdom was the truth likewise, were to be upheld at all, then that wisdom could only be derived from the Law. If demonstration were needed to back assertion they had recourse to the current method of allegorical interpretation, by which alone—failing any theory of evolutionary development—a religion embodied in a written or traditional deposit could be reconciled with the advance of thought.

The method has been employed by the Stoics in the interests of popular mythology, which became part of the religion of the Roman Empire. To some extent it was adopted by the Palestinian Rabbis, but with less depreciation of the historical truth of the narratives. Their fundamental principle was typology and their method finds Greek expression in the Pauline Epistles, and was adopted later by the Christian school of Antioch who rejected and resisted the extravagances of the Alexandrians. The Epistle to the Hebrews, on the other hand, and the Fourth Gospel show distinct traces of Alexandrian if not definitely Philonic influence. By this same method Aristobulus had proved that the Peripatetic philosophy depended upon the Law of Moses and the other books (Clem. Alex., *Strom.* v. 14. 97). Whether the extracts extant under his name (Eus., *Prep. Ev.* viii. 10, xiii. 12) are earlier or later than Philo, the method is the same as his and so is the general position. His work is described as "an interpretation of the holy laws" or "expositions of the writing (Scripture) of Moses" by Eusebius, though he does not, so far as one can judge from the fragments which remain, comment on the Pentateuch verse by verse, but rather gives a general paraphrase of its contents expounding it philosophically. But it is in the works of Philo that we find the chief monument of this reconciliation of the old and the new. He surpasses the philosophers who preceded him by his systematic industry and the superiority of the material on which he worked; those who followed him, Christians or Platonists, are his disciples.

A systematic digest of the teaching of Philo, taken by itself, gives no satisfactory idea of the man or his writings. It is possible to separate the various elements of his eclectic philosophy—Platonist, Stoic, Pythagorean, and Oriental—and so to assign him his place in the history of Greek thought. But his main object is to expound the Law of Moses: the truth revealed therein is his criterion. Accordingly it seems best to begin by taking some of his tracts

and presenting them in a summary form, so that our readers may be able to taste his quality if not his quantity.

Setting aside, then, his historical works we distinguish on internal evidence two series of expositions of the Law—(1) the *De Opificio Mundi* followed by Lives of the patriarchs, and (2) the more formal commentary which takes the Scripture verse by verse, beginning with Genesis ii, in the book of *The Allegories of the Laws*. The first group deals with general subjects and is probably intended for an audience less versed in philosophy and philosophical methods: speaking generally, more stress is laid here on the literal truth of the Scripture narratives than in the second group. So we come to Philo himself, premising only that the Bible he uses is the Septuagint and that he warns his readers to come with purified minds, freeing themselves from the allurements of this fleeting world and the outward shows of things, which hide the naked truth.

The tract *On the Creation of the World according to Moses* deals with the account of Creation given in Genesis i and ii and also the description of man's primitive innocence and fall as described in Genesis iii. Without any preface explaining the scope or motives of his work Philo begins what may well be the first of a series of homilies on the Law given by and through Moses to The Nation; for he regards the account of Creation as just the preface of the Law. Other lawgivers have been content to present their commands and prohibitions without any introduction in the form of a bare code. Others again have prefixed legendary inventions new or old, hiding over the truth thereby. But Moses, the true philosopher, anxious to prepare and mould the minds of those who should use the laws, begins with the Creation, to show that the universe and the Law are in perfect harmony and that the law-abiding man is *ipso facto* a citizen of the universe, adjusting his actions to the will of Nature according to which the whole universe also is ordered.

This idea that the Law of Moses is identical with the Law of Nature occurs again and again in Philo's extant works. He does not attempt to prove the truth of the identification, but assumes it as a self-evident proposition. The Law was the supreme example of the direct revelation of God to men, and if there was any validity in the thought of the best philosophy of his time, then it must have been derived somehow from the writings of Moses. Accordingly he is at pains to show that the great Greek thinkers of the past who had, each in his turn, contributed something to its gradual development drew their inspiration from the Hebrew Scriptures; and what he, the eclectic follower of Plato, Zeno, and Pythagoras, holds true in the teaching of his masters in philosophy he finds latent but nevertheless unmistakably expressed by the greatest philosopher of them all, one of his own race, who was king and prophet too.

So, then, the life according to Nature which the Stoic philosopher<sup>1</sup> preached was after all no more than the life of the law-abiding Jew. And, if we must needs regard Philo's axiom as a doubtful proposition, the proof lies plain for us as for him in the spirit which underlies the letter of Scripture. The beauty of these thoughts (*τῶν νοημάτων*) no one, poet or orator, could worthily set forth. Yet our author cannot keep silence, but "for the sake of his love toward God, will venture to speak even above his power, nothing indeed of his own, but few for many thoughts such as a mortal mind possessed with yearning love of wisdom may reach."

<sup>1</sup> According to Stobaeus, *Ed.* ii. 132, Zeno, the founder of the school of Stoics, taught that the "end" or goal was "to live conformably" (*τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν*), that is, according to one harmonious scheme (*τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶ καθ' ἓνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν*); and Cleanthes, his first successor, added the words "to nature." Diogenes Laertius (vii. 87) makes Zeno the author of the complete phrase, and in his next chapter ascribes to Chrysippus expressions very near those employed by Philo here, "Man's end is then, to live in accordance with nature—that is according to his own and that of the universe."

Here, again, he is resting upon one of his axioms—the legitimacy and sufficiency of the allegorical method of interpretation, whereat, as at the touch of Moses' rod, a living spring of water is to well forth from the rock of Moses' Law. But before he can expound in miniature such of the grand revelations as he can attain, he must denounce the atheism or polytheism of other (the Greek) philosophers who, wondering at the world rather than its Creator, have declared that it did not come into being but is eternal. Not so Moses. He knew that there is always an active cause and a passive cause. This world is tangible and visible, apprehended by our senses, and therefore it must have come into being (*ἀναγκάως ἂν εἴη καὶ γενητός*); for everything that is apprehended by the senses is in a state of becoming—coming into being—and of change. Only the things which are not seen are eternal. The deification of the universe abolishes Providence, that most profitable aid to godliness. Well does Moses narrate its *Genesis*, refuting by his mere title (i. e. the title of the *Greek* version) this false theology. "The active cause is the Mind of the universe, higher than virtue, than knowledge, than good itself: the passive cause is lifeless and incapable of movement of itself, but, moved and fashioned and quickened by the Mind, it changed to that most perfect work, this present world."

This position was first taken by Anaxagoras, the friend of Pericles, and thereby he showed himself, as Aristotle says, "a sober man among random talkers." He affirmed indeed that the elements of the universe were eternal, but after correcting this error Philo is content to follow him completely. "Anaxagoras first (*Diog.* ii. 6) set mind upon matter, for he thus begins his work (on Nature): 'All things were together, and Mind came and arranged them.' " And Philo adopts this conception of God in his relation to the world: throughout his account of the Creation he uses Anaxagoras' word *διακοσμεῖν*, and speaks of Moses as "possessed by a sober drunkenness." The designation Mind

suggests to him a powerful argument against atheism, to which he often has recourse. "Know thyself," he cries to the ignorant or wilful blasphemer. "See how thy body is animated and governed by the mind. As in the microcosm, so in the universe. The Mind which fashioned all things directs all things. There is—there must be a Mind of the universe, as a mind in thee, lacking which thou art dead. There is, there must be Providence—God, in fine."

But Philo the Jew, though he may adopt and employ habitually such philosophical conceptions of God as "Mind," "the Absolute," and so forth, does not rest content therewith. The God which the Greeks had found out by ceaseless speculation might be identified with, but could not supplant, the God whom his nation had come to know from his dealings with them. Philosopher he is through and through, but his philosophy rests on a firm foundation of piety, of faith in, and love toward God, the good Father. "For if any should wish to track out the cause wherefore the universe was created, methinks he would not miss the mark if he said with one of the ancients that the Father and Maker was good (*ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητήν*); wherefore he grudged not his own best nature to Matter that had no good thing of itself, yet could become all things." The ancient in question appears to be Plato, but a comparison with the apparent original shows how Philo has made it his own. In the *Timæus* (29 E) the Platonic Socrates says: "Let us say for what cause the framer framed genesis and this universe. He was good, and no good man can ever feel any grudging; and being free therefrom he willed that everything should become as far as possible like himself." Plato the Greek personified his first Cause: Philo the Jew knew God as the Father.

This much of his best-known tract may serve for introduction to the account of the *Life of Abraham* which comes next.

The first of the five books in which the sacred laws are



written is entitled Genesis because the account of the creation of the world is the most important part of it. This has been expounded as accurately as may be in the preceding treatise. Next in order come the laws themselves, particular and general. The former Philo postpones in favour of the latter, which are, so to speak, archetypes of which the others are copies. But these general laws are not precepts, but men—they who lived honourably and without reproach, whose virtues are engraved in the Holy Scriptures in order to impel (*προτρέψασθαι*) and lead the reader to a like zeal. The patriarchs in fact have come to be living and reasonable laws. Self-taught, they recognized and welcomed the ordinances of Nature, and therein found so good a law that all the particular precepts which were later written down are but the memorials of their lives.

Well then, since the beginning of the participation in good things is Hope, the first lover of hope is called Man, to show that the hopeless are but beasts in human form (Gen. iv. 26, v. 1). Enos, the Man *par excellence*, is fourth from the first earth-born man, since the number four is honoured by Moses as holy (Lev. xix. 24)—to say nothing of other philosophers (Platonists) who have “welcomed the bodiless ideal essences.” To inspire men with good hope is of course the object of all laws and lawgivers: Enos was trained in this virtue by the unwritten law of Nature.

Next after Hope comes Repentance for sin and Amendment: so Enoch, “he who is graced” (*κεχαρισμένος*), follows Enos. For “Enoch pleased God, and was not found, for God translated him.” His translation implies turning or change, and that for the better, because under God’s providence. Once translated or converted, he is not found. The wise man loves loneliness and retirement from the society of the many who delight in the evil which he has renounced. So he shuts himself up at home, or, if disturbed by frequent callers goes forth without the city, dwells in a solitude (*ἐν μοναγρίᾳ*), preferring the society of the best of

all the race of men, whose bodies time has dissolved, but whose virtues the writings left behind keep alive by poems and chronicles. So he seeks peace.

Noah, whose name means "Rest" or "Righteous," follows Enoch, and he calls the seventh day (or Sabbath, as the Hebrews call it) Rest—not, as some suppose, because after intervals of six days the people left their usual tasks, but because the number seven is in us and in the world the most peaceful of all. In us there are six things which wage unceasing war, the five senses and the spoken word (*ὁ προφορικὸς λόγος*); but the seventh power is that of Mind, which overcomes the others, and retires into solitude to commune with itself in peace. Such is the dignity of Noah that in his genealogy no man or woman is set down as his ancestor, but virtues only; for the wise man has no home, country, or kindred, save virtues and virtuous actions (Gen. vi. 9). He is a man in the true sense of the word, because he has tamed the bestial lusts of the soul, and is "righteous." And so he is perfect, not absolutely, but as compared with his generation, whose sins brought about the Deluge and their destruction.

These three men or dispositions of the soul present an harmonious order. The Perfect is whole from the beginning: the Convertito is half-made (*ἡμίτερος*), for he dedicated the former part of his life to vice, and only the latter to virtue: the Hoper is lacking, as his name denotes (*ἐλπίζων: ἐλλειπής*), ever aiming at virtue, but never attaining it.

So much for the first trinity of men who yearned after virtue. The second is far greater—Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, men of one house and race—whose names God condescended to add to his, that having a refuge for supplications and entreaties they might not lack good hope. And this supports the view that, though nominally men, they are really virtues or powers, which, being incorruptible, can more reasonably be attached to the name of the Eternal. All aim at virtue; the first by learning, the second by nature, the third by practice: not that any one

is devoid of all three, but that each takes his name from his pre-eminent quality.

After a short preface dealing with this "trinity" collectively, Philo at last reaches his main subject. Abraham, zealous for piety, the highest and greatest virtue, strove to follow God and to obey his commands, not only those conveyed through voice and writing, but those made plainer still through Nature. Scripture records many proofs of this obedience, which must be considered in order.

First of all he was charged by an oracle to leave his country, kindred and home. What other would have been so steadfast as to resist their allurements? Banishment is usually reckoned by lawgivers next to death as a punishment, and might well be thought even worse than death, as it entails a thousand deaths and consciousness of them all. Men leave their homes for many reasons—some for gain, some on embassy to serve the state, some for love of new knowledge—yet all long to return home and often leave their tasks unfinished. But Abraham departed to Haran (Gen. xii. 5) and thence to another place of which we shall speak later.

Now according to the letter of Scripture these are the travels of a wise man, but according to the laws in allegory those of a virtuous soul in quest of the true God. The Chaldeans are the great astronomers absorbed in the study of the visible world. With them and like them the soul dwells long, but at last opens its eye as from a deep sleep at the call, "Come out to the smaller city and learn to know the Overseer of the universe. Come to Haran, that is the 'caves' which are the symbol of the seats of our senses. Shall they have an unseen ruler—the mind—and the world of which all things else are parts have none?" Then God appears (Gen. xii. 7): he "was seen," for none can see or apprehend him unless he show himself. Then Abram, "lofty father," the astronomer, becomes Abraham "father of an elect sound"—the wise man free from the unstable guidance of the senses.

His second departure is to a desert where he leads a wandering life (Gen. xii. 9). They who yearn to find out God love the solitude dear to him, striving first herein to assimilate themselves to his blessed and happy nature. Whichever interpretation we adopt here, literal or allegorical, man and soul are equally venerable.

The greatness of the actions which follow can only be appreciated by those who have tasted virtue and are wont to deride what the many admire. In time of famine Abraham finds that there is corn in Egypt, thanks to the river, and goes thither with his wife. The officials, seeing his wife and admiring her beauty,—for nothing escapes those in high office—tell the king. Finding no escape from the royal lust she appeals to God; and he, the champion of the wronged, sends tortures by which king and consenting household are racked. Thus was that marriage preserved unsullied, from which was to spring “a whole nation—dearest of all to God—which seems to me to hold the priestly and prophetic office on behalf of all mankind.”

Here the literal truth of the story is so much bound up with Philo's national pride that he introduces not his own allegorical interpretation but that of others:—“I have heard, however, certain philosophers (*φυσικῶν ἀνδρῶν*) who allegorized the passage not amiss.” The man, they say, is the symbol of a good mind; the woman of virtue. Spiritually the man takes the place of the woman and the woman of the man in their marriage; for, apart from the misleading genders of the names, to those who can see things as they really are, virtue is masculine, reason feminine. The king of Egypt is—as always in Philo's own exegesis—the mind that loves the body. So the deeper meaning of the story is plain, once the actors are thus transformed.

The next incident chosen is the visit of the three “men” to Abraham (Gen. xviii). Hospitality to strangers is an offshoot (*παράργον*) of the greater virtue of piety. But the

letter of the narrative is but a symbol of what can only be comprehended by the mind. The apparition is threefold, but the object is one—God in the midst of his Creative and Sovereign Powers. True, this is not the vision of God as he is in himself, and thus it falls short of the highest bliss. But God, receiving no injury by such imperfect comprehension, gladly invites all that are purposed to honour him, in whatever form. In no-wise does he cast out any man (*μηδένα σκορακίζειν ἀξιῶν τὸ παράπαν*). Nay, to those that can hear he speaks this oracle all but aloud in the soul: “The first prize shall be given to them that worship me for myself, the second to them who do so for themselves in hope of good or freedom from punishment. Though they hope for benefit from my beneficent Power, or fear my sovereign Power, their object is still to worship me.”

Now all this is clear not merely from the allegorical treatment of the passage, but from the letter also; for Abraham says, “*Lord*, if I have found grace with *thee*” (Gen. xviii. 3), speaking to the three as one. Again, only two go to destroy the inhabitants of Sodom: the third—the Absolute God—judges it fitting that, while benefits are conferred by him immediately, punishment should be inflicted through the instrumentality of others, that so he may be accounted a cause of good only and not of evil directly.

This, then, is the superficial explanation of the story of Sodom for the many: the secret for the few, who seek for moods of the soul rather than forms of bodies, shall now be set forth. The cities of the plain are the five senses: Segon, the place of refuge, standing for sight, the queen of the senses, from which spring wisdom and love of wisdom or philosophy.

The culminating act of Abraham's life is the sacrifice of his beloved son. After giving a sketch of the incident, which includes none of the proper names of persons or places,—an omission characteristic of this group of writings—Philo proceeds to deal with certain objections. Many have

been ready to slay their children, it is alleged, to save their country from plague or defeat, or to serve their religion (cf. Deut. xii. 31). In India the gymnosophists burn themselves when that incurable disease, old age, comes upon them, and widows join their dead husbands on the pyre. But all these practices are due to custom, which has been observed so long as to become a second nature, and are therefore involuntary and therefore not praiseworthy like this deed of Abraham. Nor can any other motive be admitted, such as fear or hope of fame.

But the narrative does not come to an end with the plain and literal interpretation, but seems to suggest something which only the few can grasp. "Isaac" is the name of the son and it signifies "laughter," that is "joy," which is rightly offered to God as being his peculiar possession. So Sarah denies that she laughed (Gen. xviii. 15), fearing lest she should appropriate what belongs only to God. But she is reassured: God has mixed joy with the sorrow of men and he has willed that the soul of the wise should rejoice during the greater part of life and be glad in the contemplation of the world.

The complement of this piety or love towards God is love or righteousness towards man; and this virtue also is conspicuously exhibited by Abraham in his relations with Lot and Lot's servants for example. In fact, throughout his life, Abraham performed the law and all the commandments of God, instructed not by writings but by the unwritten law of nature, and eager to follow its healthy impulses. Such was the life of the first and captain of the Nation—law-abiding, some will say, but really, as my homily has shown, itself a law and unwritten ordinance.

The second group of Philo's works appears to be a series of homilies, or Midrashim, on the Law, containing his more advanced teaching. The tract "*concerning the descendants of Cain the wise-in-his-own-conceit and how he becomes*

*a wanderer*" begins with Gen. iv. 16. The commentator or homilist points out that this verse alone is enough to prove the legitimacy of allegorical interpretation:—"For if the Absolute ( $\tau\acute{o} \acute{o}\nu$ ) has a face and he that wishes to leave it behind can easily remove elsewhere, why do we renounce Epicurean impiety or the godlessness of the Egyptians or the mythical suppositions of which life is full?" So, to avoid attributing to God human form, and as a necessary consequence human passions, we must not take the words as literally true but turn to the way of allegory. Cain, then, the selfish, wilfully blinded the eyes of his mind and left his soul without vision of the Absolute. Worse than Adam whom God cast out, he forgoes deliberately the quest of that goal which ever recedes into the distance and evades the pursuer though he be a Moses or an Abraham. For no creature can behold God as God is: even mind, the swiftest of all things, falls infinitely short of apprehending the great First Cause, though he be touched in respect of the Creative and Punitive Powers, which are near each one of us. Yet we congratulate those God-lovers who seek after  $\tau\acute{o} \acute{o}\nu$ , though they never find; for the quest of virtue is of itself sufficient to gladden, though the good be never attained.

The land to which Cain betakes himself is Naid, that is, "tossing" or "restlessness," which properly belongs to the fool (cf. Deut. xxviii. 65 f.). Standing and steadfastness belong to God and the wise and good, to whom he imparts his own calm. So Abraham "*stood* before the Lord" (Gen. xviii. 22 f.). To Moses God said "Do thou *stand* here *with me*" (Deut. v. 31), and on the other hand (Gen. xlv. 4) to Israel "I will go down *with thee* to Egypt"—"Thou with me" when standing is in question: "I with thee" when change of place is concerned—"and I will bring thee up to the end." Clearly the descent is figurative, for God fills the universe with himself. "This I do—is Philo's paraphrase—for pity of the rational nature, that from the passions of Hades it may be brought up to the

Olympian place of virtue under my guidance, who have cut the highway leading to heaven for suppliant souls, that they might not grow weary with walking, and have shown it to all."

In considering the famous difficulty "who was the wife of Cain" (Gen. iv. 17) Philo dismisses the theory that she was his sister as not merely sacrilegious but false, for Adam's daughters were born later according to the Scripture narrative. "What then must be said? The wife of the impious Reason, as I suppose, is Opinion which he holds concerning things, just like thousands of the philosophers who have introduced some the same, others different, dogmas into our life." And the particular opinion is the maxim of Protagoras, child of Cain's folly, that man is the measure of all things; for the child of the union is Enoch, i. e. "thy grace," and all things on this supposition are the grace or gift of the mind. But this is to honour the immediate before the final cause. The strength of the dogma is shown by the victory over Abel, but "in my judgment and in that of my friends death with the pious would be preferable to life with the impious, for them that die thus will the everlasting life await, but them that live after that fashion the eternal death."

So much for Cain's son Enoch: but what of the descendant of Seth (Gen. v. 18)? Are they identical or different? The meaning of the name Enoch may be interpreted in two ways. Only some deify their mind as source of all good things: others attribute their blessings to God's graces. These, the true nobility, born not of families long rich but of lovers of virtue, are classed under Seth as chief of their clan. So with Methuselah and Lamech. Their double affinity corresponds to the ambiguity of their names "sending forth death" and "humiliation."

To return to Gen. iv. 17, it is incredible that one man should by himself build a town. Perhaps, then, since this is not in accord with the truth, it is better that we should allegorize and say that Cain resolved to prepare his own



dogma as if it were a city. Each of the impious is found to be the framer of such a city—made up of vices—in his own wretched soul.

The children of Lamech and Ada ("testimony"), Jobel and Jubal, represent change or declination, the one in mind or disposition and the other in the spoken word. So the first is the father of tenders of flocks—those occupied with the irrational sense-perceptions—and the second of music. Such declination is forbidden in the law (Num. xx. 17): the middle way is the royal road which leads to God, the first and only King of all things, and this way is philosophy. "It is not the way followed by the present herd of sophists; for they, practising the arts of words against the truth, have called cleverness (τὴν πανουργίαν) wisdom, giving a godly name to an evil thing. It is the way the ancient band (θίασος) of ascetics went—men who renounced the cajolings of pleasure and engaged themselves nobly and austere to the practice of virtue. At any rate this royal road, which we say is true and genuine philosophy, the Law calls the word of God (Deut. xxviii. 14)."

Sella is "Shadow," symbol of bodily and external good; and her son Thobel "All," for in fact they who have gotten that double blessing, hymned among the vulgar, "health and wealth," think that all things, small and great, are added to them. He is an iron worker, for all quarrels past, present, and to come are for the sake of woman's beauty, wealth, glory, honour, dominion, in a word, of bodily pleasures, or for possession of external things which are proved every one to be unsure and unsubstantial by time that tries all things. Sella's daughter is Noeman, "Fatness," the fatness not of strength but of weakness, which consists in departure from the honour of God (Deut. xxii. 15), fatness of body not of soul.

So much for Cain and his progeny. Philo now turns to consider "the regeneration (παλιγγενεσία) as it were of the murdered Abel" in the birth of Seth whose name signifies "Watering." The interpretation suggests a digression

which occupies most of the remaining part of the tract (§§ 125 ff.) dealing chiefly with the stories of Hagar (Gen. xxi. 19) and Rebecca (Gen. xxiv). In each case water stands for wisdom, "For whence should the thirsty mind of knowledge (*φρονήσεως*) be filled save from God's wisdom, the unfailing spring?" Hagar's child, whose soul has just begun to aspire after instruction is given to drink from the wine-skin. Rebecca offers the water-pot itself, saying, "drink." And thus she shows forth the divine wealth which is poured forth for all that are worthy and can use it. She brings down the pot from her shoulder, accommodating herself to her disciple, like a good teacher or a good physician, looking not to the greatness of his art but to the capacity of the patient. "For bestow not what thou canst, saith right reason, but what the suppliant is capable of receiving. Or seest thou not that God proclaimeth oracles corresponding not to the greatness of his own perfection but to the power of them that shall be benefited thereby" (cf. Ex. xx. 19). For the creature is never without a share of the gracious gifts of God—else it had been utterly destroyed—but it cannot bear the much and unstinted force of them. Wherefore, wishing that we should have profit of that which he offers, he apportioneth "the gift to the power of the receivers"—unlike mercenary sophists. And the camels in the story of Rebecca stand for memory, without which wisdom bestowed is useless. The fruit of wisdom is virtue; and though the way to it be hard yet God has changed toil from bitter to sweet. Bodily blessings are contemptible: wild beasts have them in greater perfection than rational men—though this point needs no amplification since the most reputed of the ancient sages are agreed that Nature is the mother of beasts, step-mother of men. Hard is the way of wisdom and virtue but its end is the sight of God (Deut. xxxiii. 39; cf. Ex. xxxiii. 23)—not, indeed, as he is but as he manifests himself in his acts—vouchsafed to the eyes of the mind. "And so the race of men will have use and

enjoyment of deep peace, taught by the law of nature, which is virtue, to honour God and hold fast to his service for this is the spring of happiness and long life" for states and for individuals alike.

The division between the tracts *Concerning Giants* and *That the Divine is unchangeable* seems hardly warranted, as the former ends with the words "Having said thus much—sufficient for the present at any rate—concerning the giants, let us turn to the sequel of the narrative. And it is this." It is not uncommon to find two different subjects treated in the same tract (cf. e. g. *Concerning the Progeny of Cain*, etc.).

The "many men" of Gen. vi. 1 are obviously impious men, because their children are daughters. The story of the union of these daughters with the angels of God is not a myth. Just as the universe is animated (ἐψυχῶσθαι) throughout all its parts, earth, water, fire (especially, it is reported, in Macedonia) and heaven (with stars), so the air must be filled with living things, invisible to us like the element in which they live. What Moses calls angels other philosophers call demons, souls flying about in the air. Surely air which gives life to all creatures has a natural right to a population of its own. Well, then, some souls have descended into bodies and some of them are able to resist the current of human life and fly up again: these are the souls of true philosophers, who from beginning to end practise dying to bodily life (βίου) that they may share the bodiless and incorruptible life (ζωῆς). Other souls, again, disdained union with any part of earth, and these hallowed souls, who are concerned with the service of the Father, the Creator is wont to use as servants and ministers for the protection (ἐπιστάσιν) of mortals. These are of course the good angels, angels worthy of the name. There are bad angels also, of whom the many speak as bad demons or souls, and it is they who descended to converse with the daughters of men.

Here Philo is once more in agreement with the Stoics, who held that the souls of the dead (or of the righteous dead) existed in the air until the great conflagration in which the universe was to be consumed, and that there were also demons sympathetic with men, watchers (ἐπόπτας) of human affairs (*Diog.* vii. 151, 156, 157). The statement that the universe is alive (ἐμψυχον) and full of demons is attributed to Thales and Heraclitus. Philo expounds again his doctrine of demons or angels in *de Somn.* i. §§ 134 ff. in connexion with Jacob's dream of a ladder reaching from earth to heaven. The body he regards, with Plato, as a prison or tomb, and the purest and best souls or spirits are those which never yearned for earthly life, the proconsuls of the All-ruler, who correspond to the lesser deities with whom Plato surrounds the Creator (*Tim.* 41 A).

But in evil men God's spirit cannot remain permanently (οὐ καταμενεῖ, Gen. vi. 3). It remains indeed on occasion "For who is so devoid of reason or soul as never, willing or unwilling, of his own will or without, to receive a conception of the Best? Nay, indeed, even upon the accursed there alights often of a sudden the appearance of the Good (τοῦ καλοῦ), but they cannot appropriate it or keep it with themselves. For it departs, removing straightway, renouncing the stranger in the land who has forsaken (ἐκδεδητηγμένους) law and right, to whom it would never have come at all save to convict them as having chosen base things instead of honourable."

Such men are flesh; and the fleshy nature is the foundation of ignorance. But the Law, in the ordinance against unlawful unions, commands us to despise the flesh (*Lev.* xviii. 6). A man that is truly a man—such an one as one of the ancients (Diogenes the Cynic) sought with lighted lantern at noon—will not approach that which belongs to his flesh. The emphatic repetition of the word *man* in the (Greek) text of the passage shows that it is not the ordinary human being but the virtuous man who is meant (ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπος πρὸς πάντα οἰκεῖον σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ οὐ προσελεύσεται).

They who fail to keep this law degrade themselves, "reveal their unseemliness"; and such are the self-styled wise who sell wisdom and cheapen their wares like cheapjacks in the market.

The giants who issue from this union are not those of Greek mythology: "Moses wishes to impress upon you that some are men of earth, others men of heaven, and others men of God. The men of earth are the hunters of bodily pleasures, who practise the use and enjoyment thereof and provide whatever contributes to each one of them. The men of heaven are all artists, craftsmen and scholars; for the heavenly part of ourselves—the mind—practises general education, and the other arts, one and all, sharpening and whetting, exercising and training itself in the ideal things (*τοῖς νοητοῖς*). The men of God are priests and prophets who disdained any state connected with this world . . . and have emigrated to the ideal world where they dwell, enrolled in the state of incorruptible and bodiless ideas." For example, Abram, "lofty father," is a man of heaven and rises to become Abraham "elect father of sound," that is a man of God (Gen. xvii. 1). Whereas the children of earth, like Nebrod (Gen. x. 8), are deserters degraded from their proper rank to the lifeless and motionless nature of flesh, as it is written "they twain shall be one flesh" (Gen. ii. 24).

So the beginning of the tract headed *That the Divine is unchangeable*, is reached with Gen. vi. 4: "After this, when the angels of God went in unto the daughters of men, and they begat (or bare) to themselves." That is to say, after the departure of God's spirit the comrades of darkness unite with the passions and bare unto themselves—not to God like Abraham and Hannah, the mother of Samuel, who dedicated to God the children which he himself gave them. Such selfishness is sometimes fatal, as in the case of Aunan (Gen. xxxviii. 9).

The "wrath of God" (Gen. vi. 5-7) does not, as perhaps

some will suppose, imply that the Creator repented that he had made man when he beheld their impiety. Such a theory dwarfs the crimes here recorded. For what impiety could be greater than to suppose that the Unchangeable should change? And that though some claim that not even all *men* waver in their opinions! For that they who practise a guileless and pure philosophy win as the greatest good out of their knowledge that they do not change with changing circumstances, but with unbending fixity and steadfast firmness set hand to all their tasks. This quiet, at which philosophy rightly so called aims, is the property of God and by him bestowed on the wise (Deut. v. 31, as before). And rightly, for God is free from all the uncertainties and changes which are responsible for change of mind or repentance, as he is lord of time and omniscient.

Happiness was first defined by Democritus as the calm and stable condition of the soul, which is untroubled by fear, superstition or any other passion, in his book, *περὶ εὐθυμίας* (Diog. ix. 45: Seneca *de Tranquillitate*). Timon, disciple of Pyrrho the Sceptic, held the same view (Aristocles apud Eusebium, *Prep. Ev.* xiv. 18); and it is generally identified with that school—*ἀραξία* being the fruit of *ἐποχή* or suspense of judgment—who inherited it from the physical philosophy of Democritus and handed it on to Epicurus. But Philo is probably thinking rather of the Stoic doctrine that what the vulgar reckon as good things are really *ἀδιάφορα*, things indifferent. For, as he judged schools of thought chiefly by the conduct of their scholars, his praise of the philosophers in question as guileless and pure, points not to Epicureans but to Stoics.

How then are we to understand God's wrath? First notice that there are four distinct grades in the realm of Nature—stones and inanimate things, which have habit (*ἔξῃς*); plants and vegetables, which have nature; animals, which have soul; and men, which have rational soul. Man only has freedom—freewill—and therefore only man is blameable for his meditated misdeeds, praiseworthy for

his deliberate right actions. The soul of man alone received from God freewill, and therein was made most like him; and therefore, being freed as far as possible from that harsh and grievous mistress Necessity, must be accused because it respects not him that freed it. For indeed it will most rightly pay the penalty incurred by ungrateful freedmen.

But it must not be thought that God (τὸ ὅν) is really affected by anger or any passion. For wrath is characteristic of human weakness, but to God belong neither the irrational passions of the soul nor the parts and limbs of the body. None the less, such expressions are used by the great Lawgiver, in order to lesson those who cannot otherwise be chastened. For of the laws contained in the Precepts and Prohibitions which, be it known, are laws in the proper sense of the word, there are set forth two most important summary statements concerning the First Cause—one that God is not like a man (Num. xxiii. 19), and the other that God is like a man (Deut. i. 31). But the first is guaranteed by certain truth, the second is introduced with a view to the teaching of the many, for the sake of instruction or admonition, not because he is such by nature. In fact the two statements correspond to the two divisions of mankind, men of soul and men of body. To suppose that God *really* is like a man involves the unspeakable mythology of the impious, who profess to ascribe to God the form of man but in reality credit him with man's passions. But Moses' one object is to benefit *all* his readers, and if the men of body cannot be schooled by means of truth, let them learn the falsehoods by means of which they will be benefited. They need a terrible master to threaten them. And so to these two doctrines correspond two attitudes of God's worshippers, fear and love. To them who conceive of the Absolute without any mortal part or passion, but honour him as he is, belongs the love of God, and the fear of God to every other.

But even so the meaning of the words "I was angry because I made them" is not settled. Perhaps it means

that the wicked are made by the anger of God and the good by his grace (cf. Gen. vi. 8). And so the passion anger, rightly predicated of man, is ascribed to God metaphorically in order to the explanation of a most necessary truth, that all that we do for anger, or fear, or grief, or pleasure, or any other passion, is culpable, and any actions accompanied by right reason and knowledge praiseworthy.

Noah, then, is preserved when the rest perish. The one righteous outweighs the many impious. Thus God mingles "mercy and judgment" (Ps. c. 1), showing mercy before judgment: the cup in his hand is full of a mixture of unmixed wine (Ps. lxxiv. 9: οἶνον ἀκράτου πλήρες κεράσματος). The second quotation leads, as often, to a somewhat lengthy digression. Philo's point is established by corroborative evidence from Scripture, but the evidence itself must be analysed. God's powers represented by the cup of wine are at once mixed and unmixed; unmixed so far as he himself is concerned, mixed so far as they come into contact with his creatures. Who could bear the unmixed light of the sun? What mortal could sustain God's knowledge and wisdom and righteousness, and each of the other virtues untempered? Nay, not even the whole heaven and world could receive them.

But what is the meaning of the text, "Noah found grace before the Lord God" (Gen. vi. 8). The word "found" may or may not imply previous possession. The ordinances relating to the great prayer<sup>1</sup> (Num. vi. 2 ff.) give a clear example of the finding of something previously possessed but lost. Gen. xxvii. 20 and the promises of Deut. vi. 10 f. represent the second kind of finding, treasure-trove. In Deut. i. 43 f. the Law gives the contrast to these happy finders in the persons of those who are compelled to labour against their will, doubly unhappy because they fail of

<sup>1</sup> Prayer is the asking for good things from God; but a great prayer consists in considering God in himself as the source of good things, without the co-operation of any secondary or immediate cause which appears to bestow the benefit.



their end and incur shame to boot. Each passage cited is of course fully expounded in accordance with its symbolical significance, and then Philo returns to his text. The obvious explanations are either that he obtained (ἐτυχεν) grace, or was reckoned worthy of grace. But both impute too high a dignity even for one who never debased the divine coinage within him, the most sacred mind, by evil practices. And so it might be better perhaps to adopt the view that the good man (ὁ ἀσθεῖος), having by seeking gained much knowledge, found this great truth that all things, earth, water, air, fire, sun, stars, heaven, all animals and plants are the grace of God. For he pleased not the Absolute, like Moses (Ex. xxxiii. 17), but his ruling and beneficent Powers, "Lord" and "God."

To complete the exposition, Philo recalls the story of Joseph. It is said that he "found grace" (Gen. xxxix. 20 f.), but with the gaoler, not with God; and at the touch of the wand of allegory this patriarch is transformed into the mind that loved the body and its passions, sold to the chief cook, banned from the holy assembly by the Law (Deut. xxiii. 1), and finally cast into the prison of the passions. The story of his life as a whole is given elsewhere, but this episode, taken by itself, is now used as an awful warning to the reader. Reject *such* pleasing, O soul: aim with all zeal at pleasing the First Cause. Or if thou canst not that, become suppliant to his Powers that thou may be ranked with the generations of "Noah, a righteous man, perfect in his generation, who blessed God" (Gen. vi. 9).

One might fittingly inquire why it is said immediately after this that the earth was corrupted before God, and was filled with iniquity (Gen. vi. 11). But perhaps it is not hard to attain a solution if one is not too devoid of culture. Whenever the incorruptible rises up in the soul the mortal immediately is corrupted, for the generation of the good is the death of the evil practices, since when light shines the darkness vanishes. All which is set forth in the law of

leprosy (Lev. xiii). For there it is said, contrary to the general opinion of mankind, that that which is healthy and living is the source of corruption of that which is diseased and dead: partial leprosy standing for voluntary, complete leprosy for involuntary sin. The priest convicts us of our sin, bids us purge ourselves that he may see the house of the soul clean, and if there be any diseases therein may heal them. It was so with the widow who encountered the prophet (3 Kings xvii. 10 ff.), for she is not widow in the ordinary literal sense, but one whose mind is widowed of the passions that hurt the mind, like Tamar (Gen. xxxviii. 11).

In Gen. vi. 12 "all flesh" is of course feminine in the Greek, but the pronoun "*his* way" is masculine. Some may think that there is a mistake here, and correct the inflexion (*πρώσις*). But perhaps the way is not that of the flesh alone but also that of the Eternal and Incorruptible, the perfect way that leads to God, the goal whereof is knowledge and understanding of God. This path every companion of flesh hates, rejects and attempts to corrupt; and the earthly, for such is the interpretation of Edom, bar this royal road to the seers, that is Israel. The way, as was said before, is wisdom, through which alone suppliant souls may fly for refuge to the Uncreated. They that go thereby realize his blessedness and their own worthlessness, like Abraham (Gen. xviii. 27); for they take the mean between all extremes, good disciples of Aristotle, and so draw near to God. And as we pass through the enemies' country we will not touch their water, else must we give them honour (for *τιμή* here is "honour" not "price"). For when the wicked see any of the more austere yielding to the allurements of pleasure, they rejoice and count themselves honoured, and begin to philosophize about their own evils as necessary and profitable. Say then to all such that human affairs have no real subsistence, they are but lying dreams. Consider the history of any one man and the history of the world. Hellas flourished once, but Macedonians robbed it of strength;

Macedonia flourished and fell—so was it with Persian and Parthian, with Egypt, Carthage, and Pontus ; so throughout the world the divine Logos, which men call Chance, orders the shifting fates of nations, exalting one and abasing another, that the whole world like one city may keep that best of all forms of government, Democracy. Let us have done then with mortal things and strive to have our inward judge—our conscience—favourable, as we may if we never seek to reverse any of his decisions.

The tract *On Husbandry* deals with the section (Gen. ix. 20 f.) which introduces the righteous Noah as a husbandman. The very title shows how Moses always uses the right word, for γεωργία differs from γῆς ἐργασία as implying skill and care for the ground worked. And from the consideration of the culture of the ground we are naturally led on to consider the culture of the soul. Just as all cultivated plants and trees bear yearly fruit for the service of man, so in the soul will the mind, which is the man in each one of us, reap fruit of the nurture supplied—general education, corresponding to the child's milk or advanced instruction corresponding to the bread of the man. All trees of folly and wickedness must be torn up, roots and all. Such as bear fruit, neither profitable nor harmful, must be used as bulwarks (Deut. xx. 20). For philosophy has been compared to a field by the ancients ; physical philosophy stands for the plants and trees, ethical for their fruits for whose sake they exist, and logical for the fence which guards them. So the plants sown by the agriculturist of the soul are first the practice of reading and writing readily, the exact investigation of the teaching of wise poets, geometry, rhetoric—in fact, all general education ; and then the better and more perfect studies, the tree of understanding, of courage, of soberness, of righteousness, and of every virtue. Accordingly Moses ascribes to the righteous Noah the art of agriculture, and to Cain the working of the ground, unskilled and burdensome.

These two terms then appear synonymous, but once we allegorize according to the mind of Scripture we find they are very different. So also is it with the terms "shepherd" (ποιμήν) and "tender of flocks" (κτηνοτρόφος). Both are applied to the reason, but the first to the good, the second to the bad. The soul of each one of us puts forth two shoots, which are the flocks of our nature: the one undivided, whole throughout, is called mind; the other splits into seven natures, the five senses and the powers of speaking and generation. If then a man declare himself his own master, he brings a multitude of evils upon these nurslings of his. Those then who provide them with all the nourishment they ask must be called tenders of flocks; and those who give them enough and no more, circumcising and cutting off excessive and useless profusion, are shepherds. Hence the honour paid to the art of shepherds, practised by Moses for example, in the poets and in Scripture. The Lord's congregation shall not be like sheep which have no shepherd (Num. xxvii. 17). For lack of a shepherd leads to mob-rule (Ochlocracy), that counterfeit of goodly Democracy, just as does the sway of a tyrannical or of an over-lenient governor. And the shepherd is God, who puts forth his right Reason and first-born Son to take over the care of this holy flock, the universe, like a satrap of the great king (Exod. xxiii. 20). Let the whole world then, no less than the individual, say, "The Lord is my shepherd" (Ps. xxii. 1). Such disciples of God laugh at the tending of flocks, and have worked out the skill of shepherds, as may be seen in the story of Joseph and his brethren. Joseph—he that is ever occupied with the body and vain opinions—the ever-youthful, bids the lovers of virtue avow themselves tenders of flocks to Pharaoh, the king of the land of passions (Gen. xlv. 33 f.);

<sup>1</sup> A companion work to that *On Vine-dressing* (περὶ Φυλουργίας) which follows, beginning ἐν μὲν τῷ προτέρῳ βιβλίῳ τὰ περὶ γεωργικῆς τέχνης γενικῆς ὅσα καιρὸς ἦν εἶπομεν ἐν δὲ τούτῳ περὶ τῆς κατ' εἶδος ἀμπελουργικῆς ὡς ἀν' οἷόν τε ἦν ἀποδώσομεν.

but they, true to themselves and their fathers, say: "We are shepherds, come to sojourn, not to settle" (Gen. xlvii. 3 f.). For in truth every wise man's soul holds heaven for fatherland, earth for a strange country.

Here again the allegorical method has led Philo to reverse the ordinary estimate of Joseph and his brethren. But the new view only holds good when applied to detached incidents, and in the tract *de Josepho*, which deals with the whole story, Joseph comes by his own again.

Another pair of so-called synonyms is "horseman" and "rider." The horseman is skilled in guiding and controlling his steed, while the rider is unable even to hold the reins and is thrown after a wild and random career. "Horses," of course, stand for lust and anger (e. g. in the *προτρεπτικά* of Moses, Deut. xx. 1), against which God, by his army of the virtues, defends the souls that love him. And after the victory the song of thanksgiving is sung (Exod. xv, especially verses 1, 20). No horseman, Moses says in the admonitions (*ταῖς παραινέσεσιν*), is to rule over Israel (Deut. xvii. 15 f.). It is not unnatural therefore that he should pray for the complete destruction of the horsemen (Exod. xv), and the prayer is given in Gen. xlix. 17 f., which needs explanation. Dan, "judgment," is the faculty of the soul which examines, investigates, discerns, and, in a way, judges each action, and is therefore likened to the serpent, not the friend and counsellor of Life (which is called Eve in the language of the Fathers), but the Brazen Serpent. The two stories referred to may appear mythical, but in the allegorical explanations (*ἐν ταῖς δι' ὑπονοιῶν ἀποδόσεσι*) the mythical element is entirely removed, and the truth found plain. Eve's serpent is pleasure, unable to rise, which bites man's heel. Moses' is endurance, the opposite of pleasure, which bites the horse's heel. The prophecy that "the horseman shall fall" leads to the reflexion that he who is mounted on and carried away by any passion is happiest in falling, that he may rise to virtue. Such defeat is better than victory. And so Philo comes to

consider the sacred games of Greece. Surely they are not really sacred if the prize be awarded for pitiless brutality, which the laws condemn. So then that Olympic contest alone may lawfully be styled sacred—not that which the men of Elis hold—but the contest for possession of the divine and truly Olympian virtues, for which they who are weakest in body but strongest in soul are all entered.

So much then for these pairs of words. It is time to turn to the rest of the text. “Noah began to be an husbandman.” The beginning, according to the ancient proverb, is half of the whole, but, if the rest be wanting, it is harmful. So it was in the case of Cain (Gen. iv. 7). His honour of God is right, but not his lack of discernment. And there are some like him who make piety consist in the assertion that all things are made by God, whether they be good or not. It is absurd that priests and offerings should be examined for blemishes before coming to the altar, and yet the opinions about God in each man’s soul be left in confusion. Seest thou not that the camel is an unclean beast, because it chews the cud, but does not divide the hoof (Lev. xi. 4)? The reason alleged has nothing to do with the literal interpretation, everything to do with the allegorical interpretation. Rumination stands for memory, and memory must discriminate. Both memory and discrimination are necessary to any real progress.

Daily the herd of sophists tickles the ears of their hearers with endless discriminations and divisions, and grammarians, musicians and philosophers follow suit. Yet neither they nor their hearers are bettered. Rightly are such compared to swine, unclean because they divide the hoof, but do not chew the cud (Lev. xi. 7). But from their wordy warfare all who have made a beginning or progress, or attained perfection, are exempt, for the Law thinks it right that a man should be trained not merely in the acquisition of good things, but also in the enjoyment of what he has acquired (Deut. xx. 5-7). Descend not then into the

arena lest another receive the virtues typified by house, vineyard, wife. Enter then the new house—culture that never grows old—crown not thyself rather than God; slay not thus thy soul, but remember God that giveth thee strength to do power (Deut. xxii. 8; viii. 18).

So much of Noah, who gained the first elements of the art of husbandry and then fell weak. What is said of his vine-dressing let us speak on another occasion.

The book *On Noah's Vine-dressing* fulfils the promise made at the end of "the former book," *On Noah's Husbandry*. Philo turns from the general to the particular, from the genus to the species, and takes up the greater part of this sequel with preliminary discussions. Noah's vine-planting, a species of husbandry, is not reached till § 139, where the previous sections are described as dealing with (1) the oldest and most holy husbandry which God (τὸ αἴτιον) employs in relation to the world; (2) that of the good man; (3) the ramifications of the number four.

The greatest of planters (φυτουργῶν) and the most perfect in his art is the Lord of the universe; and the plant which contains in itself the individual plants is this world, whose sure prop is the eternal Word of the everlasting God. Of these plants some possess motion (and these we call animals), some do not. Each and all have their own order and their own sphere. Greatest of all is man, whose eyes alone are so placed that he can behold the heaven; so that he is, as the old saw says, not an earthly but a heavenly plant. By some our mind is said to be a part of the aetherial nature, but Moses cannot compare the rational soul to any other created thing, only to the Creator himself. As our bodily eyes can run up to the far-off heaven, so the eyes of the soul pass the boundaries of the whole universe and press on to the Uncreated. For this reason they that pass their lives never satiated with wisdom and understanding, are said in the oracles to be "called up"; for it is right that they should be called upwards to the

Divine who have been inspired by him (cf. Gen. ii. 7). And as with the great so is it with the little world—man. In him God plants trees, his members and the faculties of body and mind.

The planting of Paradise is consonant with what has been said. The story obviously cannot be taken literally. To take one point only—for whose benefit is the garden planted? Not for God's benefit, for the Cause cannot be contained in that which is caused. Nor for man's, since no man is introduced into it at first. So, then, we must have recourse to allegory, which is dear to men capable of seeing. Indeed, the oracles clearly offer suggestions pointing thereto. The trees of life, knowledge, and so forth, are of no earthly growth, but must be virtues and virtuous actions, plants of the rational soul which revels<sup>1</sup> in God alone. No beasts are introduced into Paradise, as into the Ark: the Ark is the symbol of the body, Paradise of the virtues which welcome nothing untamed or irrational. The man who enters is not he who was fashioned after the image, but he who was created; for the other, the ideal man, does not differ from the tree which bears immortal life. And the man, or mind, proves earthly and is banished. Wherefore Moses, in pity, prays that the clear-sighted may be restored (Ex. xv. 17 f.) to the hill of God's inheritance, whether that be the universe in which they may live in accordance with nature, the *summum bonum* which they may use and enjoy, or the company of wise souls (Deut. xxxii. 7-9), who are united by virtue, while the children of earth—the sons of Adam—are scattered. Indeed, not only are such souls the portion of God, but God is also—so Moses dares to say—their portion (Deut. x. 9; Num. xviii. 20), the inheritance of the mind which is perfectly purged and, renouncing (*ἀπογινώσκων*) all created things, knows only the One Uncreated, to whom it has come, by whom it has also been received (*ὑφ' οὗ καὶ προσείληπται*). Such, Levites

<sup>1</sup> Edom means "revelling," or "luxury" (cf. Ps. xxxvi. 4).



indeed, are like the ancient philosopher who looked on a gorgeous procession and said, "See how many things there are which I do not need"—so was he enamoured of the beauty of wisdom. It is true that some who counterfeit (τῶν ἐπιμορφαζόντων) piety say that such a claim is neither holy nor safe, but this is due to their ignorance. Levites possess God just as a painter the art of painting; the possessor is not the master but the beneficiary of his possession.

Abraham is the next planter (Gen. xxi. 33), and with his "field" must be connected the well in which no water was found (Gen. xxvi. 32 f.). The well symbolizes the search after wisdom which is never satisfied: so one of the ancients (Socrates) said that his wisdom consisted in the fact that he alone knew that he knew nothing. The "name of the Lord God everlasting" (Gen. xxi. 33) refers to the two Powers of God, sovereign and beneficent respectively, as in Jacob's prayer (Gen. xxviii. 21).

But not only the wise, but we also who are not yet perfected, are commanded by the Law to learn agriculture (Lev. xix. 23-25), and to prune or purge our trees. For example, sacrificial worship is a goodly plant, but its offshoot is superstition. Piety does not, as some suppose, consist in the sacrifice itself apart from the mind of the worshipper. God's court of justice is not to be bribed. The guilty, though they offer a hundred oxen every day, are rejected; the innocent, though they make no offering, are accepted. The reference to the purging of the fruit is obviously allegorical, and the mention of the fourth year depends, as in the account of the Creation (Gen. i. 14), upon the mystical significance of the number four. The duty of thanksgiving here inculcated is to be discharged, not by offerings but by hymns, and those not vocal but mental. To illustrate this, Philo quotes the myth of Mnemosyne as an "old story discovered by wise men, handed down by memory from one generation to another, which has not escaped our ears ever greedy of instruction." The

story is that when the Creator had completed the universe he asked one of his underlings (*ὑποφητῶν*) if any thing were lacking. He answered, only speech to praise it all. The All-Father praised the answer, and soon there sprang up the race of musicians and singers from one of his Powers, a maiden Mneme (memory) or Mnemosyne. Accordingly, we say that as the peculiar work of God is beneficence so that of his creation is thanksgiving. This let us practise in poems and encomia, that the Creator and the world may both be honoured—"the one (as some one said) the best of Causes, the other the most perfect of created things."

Returning to the text (Gen. ix. 20f.), it is obviously necessary to discuss intoxication (*μέθη*) and the favourite problem of the philosophers, "Should the wise man be intoxicated." Now there are two intoxications, one the being drunk with wine (*οἰνοῦσθαι*), the other the raving in wine (*ληρεῖν ἐν οἴνῳ*). Of those who have handled the question some say that the wise man should not be intoxicated in either sense; others that the first kind befitted and the second did not befit the good man<sup>1</sup>. The arguments which support the latter position start from a consideration of homonyms and synonyms, the first being words each denoting a number of objects, the second groups of words each denoting the same object. Well, then, *μέθυ* is merely an ancient poetical synonym of *οἶνος*; therefore to be intoxicated is nothing more than to be drunk with wine; therefore the wise man will, like Noah, be intoxicated. Again, the enjoyment and use of wine in ancient times was far different from what we see to-day. The men of old first prayed, offered sacrifice, cleansed body and soul, and then joyfully held their revels in the temples where they had worshipped. Hence, some suppose the word *μεθύειν* to be derived from *μετὰ θύειν*, "after sacrifice."

<sup>1</sup> So the Stoics taught that the wise man should be drunk with wine (*οἰνωθήσεσθαι*) but not intoxicated (*μεθυσθήσεσθαι*), according to Diogenes Laertius (vii. § 118).

A third argument is likewise based upon (a different) etymology, which explains the word as the equivalent of *μέθεσις*, i.e. "relaxation" of soul. And truly, wisdom is not austere and downcast, but joyful. According to the divine Moses its end is sport and laughter; so Laughter (Isaac) sports with Patience (Rebecca), and is seen by no vulgar eye but only the king's (Gen. xxvi. 8). So wine, like wealth and fame, makes the good better, the evil worse, and the good man will be intoxicated without losing aught of his virtue.

If, as in a law court, we must employ not merely technical pleas but points of substance—the evidence of witnesses, for example—we will put forward many well-reputed sons of physicians and philosophers who in speech and in their writings plainly regard intoxication as being simply drunk with wine—which is no bad thing for a wise man in season, if he carry it not so far that he cannot keep a secret.

So far, then, Philo agrees with the Stoics in the matter, but reserves for the next treatise the teaching of Moses. The end of the tract is surely unique in a sermon (if such it be), for he calls upon those who hold the opposite view to state their case that judgment may not go by default. "No one," he says, "contending by himself is proclaimed victor, but if he so contend he will appear to be fighting shadows."

In the *de Plantatione* Philo gives, so far as possible, the sayings of the other philosophers concerning intoxication, and now turns to consider the opinion of Moses. In the Law some are commanded to drink, others forbidden (e.g. the priests, Lev. x. 9); others again sometimes forbidden and sometimes commanded (Num. vi. 2 ff.). Moses, in fact, takes a more serious view of wine than the philosophers: to him it is the symbol of insensibility (*ἀναισθησία*) and lack of education (*ἀπαιδευσία*), which produce the same disastrous results. This symbolism is clear in Deut. xxi.

18-21, where four charges are brought against the sinner:—disobedience, provocation, contribution to feasts, and intoxication. The first is, so to speak, the passive form of the second: the third, though praiseworthy if directed to a good object, is vitiated by folly: the fourth is the inflammation of boorishness or lack of education which ever burns the soul. The punishment pronounced upon the offender is that he should be expelled *from yourselves* (Deut. xxi. 21), for these guilty thoughts are within us. “Father” and “mother” may be explained either as the Creator and his Understanding (Prov. viii. 22), whose only and beloved son is the universe, or—better here—of *right reason* and *general education*.

Having thus reached an interpretation of the parents in question, Philo proceeds to discuss the four classes of their children: those who obey both or neither, and those who obey father or mother. Of the last class the plainest type is Jethro, “creation of confusion” (πλάσμα τύφου), who will go only to his own land of false doctrine and unbelief (Ex. xviii. 16; Num. x. 29 f.), and convicts himself of impiety even in his pious professions (Ex. xviii. 11), by comparing God with false gods. Laban is such another, who substitutes human laws for the laws of nature when he refuses to give his younger daughter first in marriage (Gen. xxix. 26). But the athlete of wisdom (ὁ σοφίας ἀσκητής) knows that natures are independent of time; and, to take the passage in its ethical sense, all such must first consort with the younger education, that they may hereafter attain to an undisturbed enjoyment of the more perfect and mature. Yet how amazing it is that we cannot rise out of the clutch of phenomenal good things! Once there come any hope, however faint, of wealth or fame, we yield and cannot resist. Womanish custom (for Rachel speaks “of the custom of women,” Gen. xxxi. 35) prevails, and we cannot wash it out and run to the home of men, like Sarah (Gen. xviii. 14) when she was about to bear Isaac, the self-taught; for to men belongs the following of nature

instead of custom. But though we are still the prey of our senses and passions, we shall have an ally, none the less, in our mother, middle education, who records what is considered just in every city, and lays down the law thus for this people and thus for that.

Some there are who can obey the behests of their father, and their reward is the priesthood. "And if we narrate the course of action in which they won this privilege we shall be mocked, perhaps, by many who are deceived by superficial appearances and do not descry the unseen and overshadowed powers." These priests were murderers, fratricides (Exod. xxxii. 27 ff.). Yes, but Scripture does not say murderers of *men*. Their victims are the affections of the flesh, the band of the senses and speech (ὁ κατὰ προφορὰν λόγος), which is nearest of all to the mind. Such are they who honour their father and all that is his, but think little of their mother and all that is hers.

Those who are at war with both parents are like him who said, "I know not the Lord, and Israel I send not away" (Exod. v. 2). They are not yet extinct but exist to plague mankind, impious as regards God, untrustworthy as regards their fellows.

Those who obey both are good keepers of the laws which their father, right reason, laid down, and faithful stewards of the customs which education, their mother, introduced. They were taught by the one to honour the Father of the universe, and by the other not to despise that which is universally considered justice (θέσει not φύσει). And so Jacob becomes Israel. The learner attains perfection, complete insight and wisdom. And as the art of Pheidias is stamped unmistakably on all his works, whatever the material—brass, ivory, gold, what not—so the true form (εἶδος) of wisdom, the art of arts, remains unchangeable on whatever material it be impressed.

So much, then, for the children of this pair. Rightly is the disobedient, provocative, prodigal drunkard expelled as a worshipper of the golden calf (Exod. xxxii. 17-19).

Scripture allegorizes bodily life and calls it the camp wherein is war. Far off will the wise man pitch his tent, removing to the divine peaceful life of rational and happy souls (Exod. xxxiii. 7).

"When I go forth from the city, then will I stretch out my hands unto the Lord, and the voices shall cease" (Exod. ix. 29). No man said that, but the mind which, contained in the city of the body and mortal life, is cribbed, cabined and confined as in a prison. With Abraham (Gen. xiv. 22 f.), he that has seen the Absolute recognizes no secondary cause. All good things come from God, not from the immediate sources through which we derive them. The voice of war is the voice of men who make a beginning of wine (*φωνὴν ἐξαρχόντων οἴνου*); those who wilfully take the way that leads to lack of education and folly. Pray then that this may never happen to thee, and so, when thy prayers are fulfilled, thou shalt be no longer a layman (*ιδιώτης*) but a priest.

For only to priests and worshippers of God belong sober sacrifices (Lev. x. 8-10). Aaron, "the mountainous," is the reason that minds high and lofty things and renounces wine and every drug of folly, including wine. The literal sense of the passage is wonderful enough: it is only reverent that one should come to prayers and sacrifices sober and self-possessed. If, however, we suppose that neither the tabernacle nor the altar is the visible thing fashioned out of lifeless and corruptible matter, but the unseen, intellectual object of speculation (*θεώρημα*), of which this is the perceptible image, then he will marvel the more at the command. The tabernacle is the symbol of bodiless virtue, the altar that of an image perceptible though it never be perceived, just as a log sunk in mid-Atlantic is never burned, though meant for burning. The form of words and expression shows that the writer is not conveying a command merely, but setting forth a meaning (*γνώμην ἀποφαινόμενος*). For he says, "ye shall not drink," and such an one "will not die." It is an eternal ordinance

that education is a healthful and a saving thing, and the lack of it the cause of disease and death.

Similarly, Samuel will never drink wine or strong drink (1 Kings i. 11), for he has been ranked—as his name denotes—in the ranks of the divine camp. Perhaps he lived as a man, but he has been conceived of not as a composite living thing of flesh and blood, but as a mind rejoicing only in the service and worship of God. His mother Hannah was accused of drunkenness (1 Kings i. 14), for in those inspired by God (τοῖς θεοφορήτοις) not only is the soul raised but the body is flushed and inflamed by inward joy. Great is the boldness of the soul that is filled with the graces of God. This then is the band (χορός) of the sober, who make education their leader; the other that of drunkards, whose leader (ἑξαρχος) is boorishness (ἀπαιδευσία).

The other sense which “wine” bears in Scripture is insensibility or ignorance, the insensibility of the soul, the opposite of which is skill or knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), which is, so to speak, the soul’s eyes and ears. There are two kinds of ignorance, the one simple, i.e. complete insensibility, the other double when one is not only possessed by lack of knowledge but imagines he knows what he does not know, being uplifted by a false opinion of wisdom. Of these the second is the greater evil, as it produces wilful wrongdoing. So Lot has two daughters, Counsel and Consent, by his wife Convention, who was turned to stone (λιθουμένης); and they lead him completely astray. But as a matter of fact the senses are not sure guides. Many of the objects of sense are continuously varying. Among animals the chameleon and the polypus change colour with their environment; the dove’s neck changes its hues in the sun’s rays; and the reindeer is hard to hunt, not so much on account of its strength as because it adopts a protective colouring suited to any surroundings. The same variation is found among men. Often at a theatre I have seen some of the audience so

carried away by the performance as to rise involuntarily and applaud, others as unmoved as the benches on which they sit, and others so alienated as to get up and go, hands over ears.

The refraction of water and the deceptiveness of a distant view all point in the same direction. Indeed we can never perceive any sensible object as it is, but always in relation to something else. Nothing at all in the world is known save by comparison with its opposite. All sense-perception is a complex process and therefore uncertain, and even judgments of right and wrong depend upon early education in the case of most men. The multitude believes what was once delivered to it, and, having left its mind untrained, affirms and denies without independent examination. The philosophers, on the other hand, who test and examine all questions, logical, ethical and physical, cannot agree in their answers. So reserve of judgment is the safest course.

The *de Sobrietate* naturally follows the *de Ebrietate* (though the latter is perhaps imperfect, lacking as it does any full exposition of the nakedness of Noah), and the discourse deals with Gen. ix. 24-27. Philo has little to say about sobriety, but that nothing can be better than a sober intellect, nothing so valuable as the clear insight of the soul which it brings. This done, he turns to the text and fastens on "the *younger* son," which is proved from Scripture parallels to refer not to age but to maturity of mind. Ishmael, the sophist, though a youth, is called a *child* in comparison with Isaac the philosopher (Gen. xxi. 14-16). The whole people Scripture calls *children* (Deut. xxxii. 4-6) when they behave as such. Rachel, who stands for bodily beauty, is younger than Leah the beauty of the soul. Joseph is always *young* or *younger* (Gen. xxxvii. 2; xlix. 22). Similarly, *elder* is first applied to the wise Abraham, the shortest-lived of all the patriarchs (Gen. xxiv. 1). The seventy colleagues of Moses are *elders*



whom the wise man knows (Num. xi. 16). The significance of these terms is clearly set forth, for those who are skilled to hear, in one commandment of the Law, viz. that relating to the children of the beloved and hated wives (Deut. xxi. 15-17). The beloved wife is the symbol of pleasure, her child the pleasure-loving temper; the hated wife is the symbol of understanding, and her child the love of virtue. The first is always a *child*, the second an *elder* from his cradle. Accordingly Esau, the elder in point of age, resigns his birth-right to Jacob; and Ephraim, who is "Fruitfulness," i. e. Memory, is preferred before Manasseh, who is Forgetfulness.

But why does Noah curse the child of the offender and not the offender himself (Gen. ix. 25)? Wherein did Canaan sin? Well, those who are accustomed to elaborate the literal and superficial meanings contained in the laws have considered them by themselves perhaps, but let us obey the suggestions of right reason and interpret the underlying meaning. Ham means "hot," Canaan "commotion." Both are evil, the one quiescent, the other in motion. Rightly then is Canaan the son of Ham, and rightly is Canaan cursed. For being moved to sin Ham himself becomes Canaan. So is the law that the sins of the fathers are visited on the children (Ex. xx. 5) justified; the results, or children, of reasonings are punished, while they, if no culpable action be laid at their door, escape accusation.

Shem is, as has been said before, the eponymous good kind of man, and God is his God. He who, like Shem and Abraham (Gen. xviii. 7), has God as his portion (κληρον) has passed beyond the bounds of human happiness.

With regard to the blessing of Japheth, we are not clearly told who is to dwell in the tents of Shem. It is possible to understand that it is the Lord of the universe. What more fitting home could be found for God than a soul perfectly cleansed, counting virtue (τὸ καλόν) the only good? Of course he will dwell there not as in a place—contained therein—but as bestowing special forethought and attention upon

it, like every master of a house. But perhaps the whole prayer refers to Japheth, that he may reckon all worldly goods at their true rate and seek only those of the soul.

The *de Confusione Linguarum* opens thus: "As far as these things are concerned what has been said will suffice"—probably referring to the group of homilies relating to Noah—"next we must consider, and not casually (*οὐ παρ' ἐργῶς*), the philosophy of the narrative of the confusion of languages" (Gen. xi. 1-9). And now Philo explains the position of the antagonists, hinted at in the beginning of the *de Gigantibus*. Certain Jews, presumably Hellenists, disgusted with the ancestral polity, always grumbling and carping at the laws, use this and other such passages as stepping-stones for their atheism, impious that they are. They say "Do you still make solemn professions about your code as containing the canons of truth itself? See, your holy books contain myths such as you deride, when you hear others reciting them." Well, we have not their leisure to search out these scattered myths, and will be content to deal with the passage in hand.

The first parable is the myth of the Aloeidae, who piled Ossa upon Olympus and Pelion upon Ossa. But notice Moses speak of a tower. The second is a myth, akin to that before us, relating to the common speech of living things recorded by fabricators of myths. It is said that in ancient times all living things, animals, fishes, and birds, had a common speech, so that they could sympathize with each other's sorrows and joys, as now Greek with Greek and barbarian with barbarian. Then, sated with their unstinted supply of blessings, as often happens, they all turned to longing for the unattainable and treated for immortality, asking for destruction of old age and for perpetual youth, alleging that one of their number, the serpent, had already obtained this gift. But they paid the fitting penalty for their presumption; for their one common language was immediately cut up into different

languages, so that they could not understand one another. Here again a discrepancy is to be noted, for Moses speaks only of *men* as having the same speech. It is said that the scriptural account is as mythical as the parables cited, and that the division or confusion of tongues was a cure for sins, intended to prevent men from conspiring together to do evil. But the latter theory is untenable. If wicked men wish to conspire they will not be stopped by the difference of their languages. They can always communicate, like men whose tongues have been cut out, by means of signs. Again, if a man learn many languages, he is always held in good repute among those who understand them, and regarded at once as a friend. In fact, the literal interpreters of the Law alone will refute these students of comparative mythology, without opposing sophistry to sophistry.

Well then, we understand this scripture to refer to the universality of evil both in the world and in the individual. Heaviest of all evils, and wellnigh incurable, is the co-operation of all parts of the soul in sin, when no one part is able to heal the rest, but physicians and patients are sick together, as at the time of the Deluge (Gen. iv. 5-7). We must flee all associations for purposes of sin, and confirm our agreement with companions of understanding and knowledge.

In this connexion the saying, "we are all sons of one man, we are peaceable" (Gen. xlii. 11), is introduced as an example of perfect harmony, and leads to a consideration of its origin and its complement. Inevitably will they love peace and hate war whose one and the same father is not mortal but immortal, God's man, who being the Logos of the Eternal is of necessity himself also incorruptible. Their life is peaceful, while the polytheist's is full of strife, and yet not, as some think, lazy and ignoble. Men of peace are men of war when opposed to the enemies of the soul's peace. Such is the disposition of each lover of virtue, and the words of the inspired prophet bear the

same testimony: "O mother, what manner of child am I? a man of war" (Jer. xv. 10).

"The East," or "Dawn" (Gen. xi. 2), bears two meanings in Scripture, according as it refers to the dawning of light or of shadow in the soul. It is used in the good sense in the account of Paradise (Gen. ii. 8). So in the oracle of one of Moses' companions (Zech. vi. 12), "Behold a man whose name is Dawn or 'Rising'." A most novel title this, if you suppose that a man composed of body and soul is spoken of; but if it be that bodiless man who is identical with the divine image you will confess that the title is most happy (*εὐθυβολώτατον*). For him hath the Father of the universe raised up to be his oldest or first-begotten Son. "East" occurs in a bad sense in the story of Balak the fool and Balaam (Num. xxiii. 76 f.).

It is notable that these fools "find" the place most fitted for their folly, and "settle" there. Both points are significant. No wicked man is content with the crimes towards which his evil nature proceeds of itself, but invents fresh ones and therein abides. Therefore are all they whom Moses reckons wise introduced as sojourners, who reckon heaven their fatherland. Thence were they sent as colonists and thither they yearn to return (Gen. xxvi. 2, xxxiii. 4, xlvii. 9; Exod. ii. 22).

The mention of "bricks" (Gen. xi. 3) naturally suggests the bondage of Israel, in which the Egyptians compelled them to make bricks and to build fenced cities. The eye of the soul which alone can see God, bound in the bodily nets of Egypt, groans over its task (Exod. i. 11, ii. 23). But the way to freedom is sure. For all men labouring for gain, or fame, or pleasure there is ransom and salvation in the worship of him who alone is wise (Exod. viii. 1). Right is it for them that keep company with knowledge to aspire to see the Absolute and, if that they cannot, then at least his likeness, the most holy Word, and after him the world, the most perfect of sensible things; for philosophy is nothing else than to study to see these distinctly.

The Lawgiver uses "city" not only in the ordinary sense but also of that which a man carries about, built in his own soul, whereof those built on earth of material substances are but copies. How evil their city is, how shameless the exposure of their guilt, is shown by the warning of their conscience which foresees their impending dispersion (Gen. xi. 4). Their tower is like that recorded in the Book of Judgments, Phanuel, that is, "Aversion of God" (Judg. viii. 9).

The statement that "the Lord came down to see the city and the tower" (Gen. xi. 5) must certainly be understood metaphorically. To suppose that the Divine should really share the positions and motions of men is monstrous impiety (*ὑπερῳκένιος καὶ μετακόσμιος ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ἀσέβεια*). The human phrases are applied to God, who is not human in form, for the benefit of our education. And this particular expression is by way of being an exhortation, that no one should refrain from examining things closely, or judge by hearsay (Exod. xxiii. 1). Let no one think that the addition "which the sons of men had built" is otiose and insignificant. We must track out the hidden treasure of Scripture. The "sons of men" are polytheists; the worshippers of the One are styled "sons of God" (Deut. xiv. 1, &c.).

The words put in God's mouth need careful attention, "Come and let us go down and confound there their tongue" (Gen. xi. 7). For he appears to be speaking to some who are as it were his fellow workers, as at the creation of man (Gen. i. 26, cf. iii. 22). First, it must be said that there is no existing being equal in dignity with God: there is one Ruler and Governor and King, to whom alone it belongs of right to govern and order the universe. The poet's saying, "the rule of many lords is no good thing; let there be one lord, one king," applies better to the world and God than to cities and men. The next point is that God, being One, has innumerable Powers around him, all defenders and saviours of the universe, and with them the

Powers of punishment, that is the prevention and correction of sins. By these the ideal world was framed and man also. God entrusts to them tasks which befit him not, for man is prone to err in his free choice between good and evil, and the way toward evil in the rational soul must not be created by God through himself. So God is the cause of all good and of no evil at all; the evil is allotted to his angels or Powers, which work under his supervision.

God says, "let us *confound* their tongue." It is not, then, as the literalists suppose, simply the division of the speech of mankind which is the penalty of their sin. Yet I would not blame those who follow the superficial sense, for perhaps even they have reached the truth; but I would urge them not to be content therewith, but to come over to the metaphorical interpretations, regarding the letter as the shadow and the inherent spirit as the fact or substance. By choice of the word *confusion* the Lawgiver directly suggests a deeper meaning. If he referred only to the origin of different languages, *distinction* would have been the better word. Confusion is the abolition of the powers of each element of a compound or mixture in order to the production of the compound. Here the end in view is the dissolution of the fellowship of wickedness. And if we apply the Scripture again to the individual, it is obvious that God has separated the parts of the soul. It is fitting for God to tune the harmony of the virtues and to dissolve and destroy that of the vices. Now confusion is the most appropriate name of wickedness, as any fool proves plainly, as his words, counsels, and actions are all reprobate and confusion<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> A further article on Philo will follow in a subsequent number of the *J. Q. R.*